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INDUCT IVE INFERENCE AND THE REPRESENTATION OF UNCERTA INTY 
N. C. DALKEY·* 
The form �nd justification of inductive inference rules 
depend strongly on the represent�tion of uncertainty. This 
paper examines one generic representation, namely, incomplete 
information. The notion can be formalized by presuming that 
the re}�vant probabilities rn a decision problem are known 
only to the extent that they belong to a class K of proba­
bility distributions. The concept is a generalization of a 
frequent suggestion that uncertainty be represented by inter­
vals or ranges on probabi 1 ities. 
To maKe the representation useful for decisionmaking, 
an inductive rule can be formulated which determines, in a 
well-defined manner, a best approximation to the unknown 
pr·obability, given the set K. In addition, the knowledge 
set notion entails a natural procedure for updating--modi­
fying the set K given new evidence. Several non-intuitive 
consequences of updating emphasize the differences between 
i nfer·ence w i th comp I e te and inference with i ncomp 1 e te 
information. 
2. Knowledge � 
The basic frame of reference is an algebra of sets E; 
i.e., a set of events closed under disjunction and negation. 
In a medical context, for example, E might be the combined 
set of disease states, symptoms, and test results. It is 
assumed that there is a probab i I i ty function .E. on E; hc•wever·, 
.E. is not completely Known. What is known is that f is con­
tained in a set K of probability functions on E. Thus, some 
bounds on the pr·obab i 1 it i es may be known, or the expectation 
of one or more random variables may be Known, and the 1 ike. 
In the case of complete ignor·ance, K i�. the class Z of all 
possible probabi 1 ity functions on E. For the case of com­
plete information, K is a unit set. In the general case, 
K is some subset of z. 
Roughly, the size of the knowledge set K represents the 
degree of uncertainty concerning P. A large K indicates high 
uncertainty, a small K indicates fairly complete infor·mation. 
The relationship K C K' imposes a partial order, in fact a 
lattice, on the subsets of z. KC K ... can be inter·preted as 
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�K is less uncertain than K'". For a given event e, the 
inter0al max P<e) - min P < e) is a rough measure of the uncer­
tainty concerning e. 
The Knowledge set representat i on of uncertainty is the 
starting point for a number of approaches to decisions with 
i ncomp I e te i nfor·ma t ion, inc 1 ud i ng the game-aga i nst-na tur·e 
[Wald, 50; Blackwell and Girshick, 541, several variants of 
maximum entropy methods [Jaynes, 68; Kullbac K , 59], and the 
author's min-score theory of induction, which is a general i­
zation of the first two [Dalkey, 82]. 
One approach to uncertainty that has aroused consider­
able interest as a potential "inference engine" for expert 
systems is the Dempster-Shafer belief-function theory. 
[Shafer, 76; Gordon and Short! iffe, 84J At first glance, 
be 1 i ef functions do not appear· to fit the knowledge set 
represen tat i c•n; however, K >'burg ha• recent 1 >' shown that that 
a belief function Bel can be mapped onto a class of proba­
bility functionE. K<Bel), namely, th e s.et of P''E· such that 
P<e) � Bel<e> for al 1 e in E. [Kyburg, 85J On this repre-
sentation, Bel(e) = min P(e). As Kyburg points out, 
K < Bel ) 
knowledge sets are much more general than belief functions; 
any Bel can be expressed by a K, but most K's cannot be 
expressed by a Bel. 
3. Inductive Inference 
A Knowledge set K--especially if it is l arge- -is not a 
very useful guide for action. Belief functions, for example 
have been criticised on the gr ounds that they do not have a 
clear role in decision analysis. 
The game against nature, maximum entropy methods and 
min-score the or>' bridge the gap be tween a knowledge set and 
decisions by invoKing a form of inductive inference. By 
assumption, the actual probability f is in K; a natural 
question is, can a "best guess" be selected fr·om K which 
is, in a reasonable sense, a best approximat ion to f? 
The question presupposes a measure of the goodness of 
the approximation. An appropriate measure is available in 
the theory of proper scor es . Consider a partition of events 
E, and an estimate Q which is a probability distribution on E 
A score rule is a function S < Q, e) which assigns a � at i ng 
to the estimate Q depending on which event e in E occurs. 
A score rule is called proper (admissable) if it fulfills 
the condition 
L P(e)S(Q1e) � 
E 
L P(e)S< P, e> 
E 
( 1 ) 
That is, a sco�e rule is called proper if the expectation 
of the score is a max i mum when the estimate is the same 
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as the distribution which determines the expectation. 
There is an infinite family of functions which fulfill 
< 1). Among these ar·e the 1 ogar i thm i c score S< Q , .,_e) = 1 og Q( e) and the quadratic score S(Q, e) = 2Q(e) - L Q(e). An impor-
E 
tant sub-family consists of the decisional scores: Let 
U<a, e) be the payoff if action a is taken and e is the 
state of nature. Let a*(Q) be the optimal action assuming 
Q is the distribution on the states of nature. S(Q, e) = 
U<a*(Q), e) is a proper score. Decisional scores furnish 
an intimate tie betw�en deci·sion theory and the theory 
of inference. 
It is convenient to introduce the definitions: 
GCP, Q) = I P(e)S(Q, e); H<P> = G<P, P) = r P(e)SCP, e). 
E E 
Given a knowledge set K, if a distribution Q is posited 
the actual expectation is G<f_, Q), The analyst would like to 
select a Q to make this quantity as large as possible; 
however, since f is unKnown, a direct maximization of G<f, Q) 
is undefinable. On the other hand, the analyst can determine 
the Q which maximizes the minimum (over P) of G<P, Q). The 
maxmin clearly can be guaranteed and thus can be considered a 
lower bound to what can be obtained, Knowing K. 
An upper bound can be set by examining the value of 
additional information. In the theory of decisions with 
complete information, it is a theorem that additional infor·­
mation leads to a higher expectation. [ Lavalle, 78] This 
result is often called the positive value of information 
<PVD pr·inciple. Ther·e is no way to demonstr-ate PVI for 
incomplete infor-mation. However, the principle ap.pears to 
apply a for-tiori to the case of uncer-tainty, and hence is a 
reasonable candidate for a new postulate. In the previous 
section, it was noted that if K C K", then K is mor-e i nfor·­
ative than K". We thus are led to the postulate: 
Pl. If K C K" and K is not empty, V<K> � VCK'. > 
Here V<K> designates the value of knowing K. An immediate 
consequence of P 1  is V<K> 'V<P>, P any member· c•f K, c•r· e-qui­
valently, V<K> �min V<P>. 
K 
Despite the apparent weakness of Pl, it has the strong 
consequence that a strict upper bound to the value of Knowing 
K is the minimum value of any me-mber of K. The- e-xpression 
V<K> was introduced informally; however, it seems reasonable 
to interpret V<P> as H<P>. Thus, we can summarize 
max min G<P, Q) � V<K> � min H<P> 
Q p p 
From < 1> we have min max G<P, Q) = min 
p Q p 
1 11 
G<P, P) = min 
p 
( 2) 
H< P> . 
Thus the bounds set by (2) ar-e pr-ecisely the bounds set by 
the game against natur-e, wh•re P is a strategy selected by 
natur-e, and Q is a str-ategy selected by the analyst. Many 
critics have objected to the game against nature on the 
gr-ounds that it assumes "natur-e" is both rational and hos­
tile; however, <2> does·r.ot involve either- assumption. 
The upper bound is imposed by the r-equir-ement that addi­
tional infor·mation be- of positive value. 
If K is convex and closed, the game against nature has 
a solution. [BlacKwell and GirshicK, 54, theorem 2.5. 11 For 
some scores such as the log score or the quadraditic score, 
wher·e G< P , Q) is str· i c t 1 y concave in Q, ther·e is a pur·e str·a­
tegy for both the analyst and nature, and we can assert 
max min = min max--the lower and upper bounds coincide. In 
this case min H<P> is the unique solution, leading to the 
infer·ence rule 
Min-scor-e r-u I e: Given a Know I edge set K and a scor·e 
r-ule S, select as a best guess the Q in 
K that minimizes H(Q). 
For the logarithmic score, HCP> = I P<e>logP(e) = 
E 
-Entropy<P>. Thus, the min-score rule is equivalent to the 
maximum entropy rule for the log score. The min-score rule 
can also be applied to the associated class K(Bel) of a 
belief function Bel, thus affording a tie between belief 
functions and decision theory. 
4. Updating 
In addition to an inference rule, a complete theory of 
induction requires an updating procedure, i.e., a method of 
revising an estimate given new evidence. In effect, this 
entails a method of modifying the Knowledge set K based on 
the new evidence, since the revised estimate can then be ob­
tained by applying the min-score rule to the new K. 
UnliKe classic probability theory, updating with uncer­
tainty requires two separate procedures, depending on whether 
the new evidence affects or does not affect the unknown 
probability f. Strictly, a knowledge class K should be en­
visaged as deriving from some body of evidence I, and thus 
be denoted by K<I>, say. As long as K remains fixed within 
a pr-oblem, there is no need to formalize the dependence on I. 
If new evidence I·' becomes ava i 1 able, however, the role of I/ 
in modifying K must be made explicit. 
One Kind of new evidence does not change the underlying 
unKnown probabi 1 ity f., but only what is Knc.wn about f. As a 
simple example, supf:•C•se at fir-st the investigator Knows only 
the average of some r-andom variable, but at a later- date 
lear-ns the variance as well. Clearly, the same E is involved; 
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all that has changed is that more information about E. is now 
available. We can call modifying K in 1 ight of evidence 
which does not chi.nge the underlying probability Knowledge 
updating. If the appropriate Knowledge set K<I') based 
separately on the new evidence I' can be determined, then 
clearly the new Knowledge set K<I.I') = K<I>.K<I')--the inter 
section of the old and additional Knowledge sets. 
Knowledge updating is roughly analogous to Dempster's 
orthogonal-sum composition for belief functions, but has a 
number of advantages: ( 1) No assumptions concerning the 
i'ndependence of the old and additional evidence is requir·ed. 
(2) The procedure contains a built-in consistency checK; 
if K <I.I·') is empt>-, then one or· both of the two pieces of 
evidence is incorrect. ( 3) The procedure fulfi lis the posi­
tive value of infor·mation in a str·ong way; K<I.J') c K<I>, 
and max P<e> - min P(e) � max P<e> - min P(e) for every 
K<I.J') K\1.1-') K<I> K(J) 
event e. 
The second type--information updating--extends classical 
updating to the case of uncertainty. The proto-type is that 
in which the new evidence I' consists of learning that some 
event e in E has occurred. In this case, the new K con�ists 
of conditioning each Q in the old K on the event e, or 
for·ma 1 1  y 
K<I.e) = CPithere is a Q in K and P = Q(• fe)) 
It is noteworthy that since every Q in K is a complete proba­
bility function, everything is Known to compute the condi-
t ion a 1 fun c t i on Q ( • I e) • 
Informational updating is the analogue of the Shafer 
condi tiona! belief function Bel<AIB), but is considerably 
more general, since it applies to K"s which ar·e not belief 
functions, and even for belief functions may be more exten­
sive than the K generated by Bel<AIB). 
No new consequences concerning min-score inference re­
su 1 t from Knowledge updating; however, direct app 1 i cat i c•n of 
the min-score rule to K's derived from informational updat­
ing will generally lead to misestimates--a topic deserving 
a separate section. 
5. Min-scor-e Infer-ence with Information Updating 
By definition, since E. is in K<I>, E.<• I e) is in K<I.e). 
·Thus, it would appear at first glance that the justification 
of the min-score rule for- K<I> would carry over to K<l.e). 
However·, pr-oblems can ar·ise, illustr-ated by the followir•g 
example: Suppose we have an experiment with binary events 
e and e, and binar-y obser-vations i and T. Let p denote the 
prior- probability of e, q the 1 ikel ihood of i given e, and 
113 
r the 1 ikel ihood of i given e. Suppose p is completely un­
Known, but q and r are Known. Without loss of generality, 
we can suppose q > r. If we set p = r/Cq-r>, then the pos­
terior of e given i is 1/2. Thus, for any symmetric score 
r·ule, the min-scor·e estimate for the posterior is completely 
un i formative. 
The difficulty is that the naive application of the 
min-score rule does not employ all the information that 
is avai lable; it over·looKs the fact that we knc•w something 
about i. To rectify this oversight, it is necessary to 
ex tend the ana 1 ys is by tr·ea t i ng the new K as an i ncomp 1 e te 1 Y 
Known information system. An information system consists of 
a set of events of interest or hypotheses E and a set of 
potential observations (data, signals, symptoms, messages, 
etc.) I. There is a joint pr·obability distribution P<E.I) 
on hypotheses and observations; but the probabilities of 
direct interest are the conditional distributions P<Eil) 
of the events given the observations. 
as 
The expected score of an information system is defined 
H<EII> = L PCi) I. P < eli) S(i, e) 
I E 
where S<i ,e) is shorthand for the score obtained if PCel i) 
is the estimate and event e occurs. In words, the total 
expected score for the information system is the average 
of the expected scores for conditional estimates based 
on the observations. 
For the case of uncertainty, where K is a set of joint 
distributions PCE.I) , the appropriate application of the min­
score rule is to select the joint distribution Q out of K 
which minimizes the expected score H<EII) . In that way, all 
of the information in K is taKen into account. It can be 
shown that the two basic properties--guaranteed expectation 
ar.d PVI--hold for this procedure. £Dalkey, 80J 
As an elementary example, consider the case of the 
exper· i men t with unKnown prior cited above. K consists 
of all joint distributions on E and I derivable by setting 
p to any value between 0 and 1. If we opt for the logarith­
mic score, the inference consists in selecting out of K 
the minimally informative information system. An equi­
valent statement of the problem is to select out of the 
interval [0,1] a best-guess prior P* which minimizes HCEII) . 
The second formulation has some historical interest; the 
issue of dealing with unKnown pr· i ors is is old as the theorem 
of Bayes. For this elementary example, P* can be found by 
solving for p the implicit equation 
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H(q)-H(r) (;' )q-r 
_e_ e = pq+<1-p>r 
, 1-p p < 1 -q) + < 1 -p) ( 1-r ) 
(3) is not particularly "intuitive". In effect, it 
udownplays"--i .e., gives lower prior weight to--the more 
info�mative hypothes�•· 
('3) 
If the example is extended to multiple observations, 
some surprising effects appear. The best-guess prior com­
puted for a single observation is not the same as the prior 
computed for several observations; the prior is a function of 
the number· of obser·vations. This r·esult suggests that the 
amount of information in large samples with unKnown prior 
is decidedly less than indicated by classical sampling 
theory. In the case of complete information, a posterior 
distr·ibution obtained from an obser·vation can be used as 
a new prior to predict the occurrance of subsequent obser­
vations. This transfer is not valid for min-score priors; 
a new prior must be determined for the prediction. 
£Da1Key, 85J Thus, there is a basic difference between the 
diagnostic import and the prognostic import of observations, 
a fact of some consequence for the configuration of expert 
systems. 
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